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Turning Street Children into Entrepreneurs

By David South, Development Challenges, South-South Solutions

SOUTH-SOUTH CASE STUDY 

The UN estimates that 500 million people around the world are homeless, and UNICEF estimates India alone has 11 million homeless children on its streets (though it is difficult to pin down the figure). In order to survive another day, these children will work in one way or another. While there are many campaigns to ban children from working, and charities dedicated to getting them off the streets and into shelter, the raw fact remains: many of these children slip through the cracks and remain vulnerable, poor and neglected.

Most street children suffer from malnutrition, hunger, health problems, and abuse. They make ends meet by working various jobs or by stealing. While they have dreams, there is no mechanism for them to save for the future. It is a live-for-now existence that, if they survive to adulthood, means they will probably remain homeless and vulnerable.

Street and working children have money: it is a natural consequence of having to be resourceful to survive. But what they don’t have is access to banking services or trustworthy financial advice that can help them to gain wealth and move out of poverty and into a brighter future.

The Children’s Development Bank in India is one initiative that seeks to turn these neglected children into the next generation of entrepreneurs. The bank works on banking and co-operative principles, where savers are members and joint owners of the bank. Any child can save money with the bank and earn interest, as well as take out loans if they are over 15 years old. It was started in 2001 and was inspired by the Youth Bank in the UK. Interest made by the bank is shared by its members, as with many co-operative banks and credit unions.

The bank is managed jointly by children and adults. The children have a say in how the bank is run and on what conditions it should lend money. They also keep an eye on borrowers to prevent them from running off without repaying loans.

For these vulnerable children, it has many advantages: they can put money aside without fear of it being stolen or lost, save for important things like clothes, or pay for their education.

A key part of the bank’s mandate is helping the children build entrepreneurial skills for business. Mentors help the children choose a business model, select an occupation with minimal risk and more benefits, get training and solve business problems.

The bank has branches in India, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka.

Ten-year-old Deepak Prahlad, a street child in Delhi, dreams of being a doctor.

“I know what it takes to be a doctor. I need to study hard and need to save a lot of money,” he told the Hindustan Times. For now, he works as a rag picker but has started saving 30 to 40 rupees a day in the Children’s Development Bank. The bank has 1,300 members in the city. It pays 3.5 per cent interest on savings accounts.

“Some of them want to fly very high,” said Rita Panicker, who helped set up the bank in 2001. “We have been working with street children for the past two decades. Some of these children are very talented and have entrepreneur qualities. One of the biggest problems facing these children was that they did not have a safe place to keep their hard-earned money. In fact, it was the children who came up with the idea of the children’s bank. It started with 20 members in 2001 – and now it has 1,300 members in Delhi.”

Sudesh, a 15-year-old manager who looks after the bank’s current accounts, said: “We are extremely careful about whom to offer loans since we do not want to see our members’ savings lost because of bad loans. The skills I have learnt here are going to stand me in good stead in life.” Managers are chosen every six months by the children and they compete for the job.

Resources:

  • Making Cents International: “It inspires youth, practitioners, policy makers and funders to more effectively share and develop parnerships, programmes and policies that support youth entrepreneurs.”
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Does the UN know what it’s doing?

By David South

Now Magazine (Toronto, Canada), July 22-28, 1993

The United Nations’ bloody hunt for elusive Mogadishu warlord general Mohamed Farah Aideed has many observers wondering whether the world body is making up the rules as it goes along.

Some critics, such as George Cram of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation, an influential umbrella group for Canadian non-governmental organizations of NGOs, question if the obsession with Aideed isn’t just burying the UN in a deeper image problem with the Third World.

Critics point to the fallout of growing resentment from the July 12 attack on Aideed’s compound – killing more than 70 civilians – boding ill for a peaceful reconstruction of Somali society.

The fact that among those killed within the compound were clan elders who were negotiating a peace has upset Somalis even more, says Cram, a Horn of Africa researcher.

“The UN has lost its credibility, its moral authority, lost its blue-beret neutrality,” says Cram bluntly.

The degree to which Aideed should be the main focus of current UN actions has some relief agencies scratching their heads. Aideed has become Somalian bogey man number one with UNOSOM’s (United Nations Operations in Somalia) head, US Admiral Johnathon Howe. He has placed a $25,000 price on Aideed for an arrest.

“I don’t recall the UN ever going out and actually attempting to arrest individuals – they certainly haven’t done it in other conflict zones,” says reverend David Hardy of Saskatoon-based Lutheran Relief, who has organized relief flights into Somalia.

Cambodian example

He cites the example of Cambodia, where the UN brokered a controversial peace with those purveyors of the genocidal killing fields, the Khmer Rouge, in order to secure free elections.

David Isenverg of the Center for Defense Information, a liberal Washington-based think tank, worries that doggedly going after Aideed while ignoring the other factions will paint the UN as siding with one faction over another.

“The protracted effect is to turn the US and UN into partisans to the conflict.”

Hardy believes Aideed, who is adept at seeing which way the wind blows, has inflated his stature as an opponent of the UN as foreign invader.

Then there are other criticisms. Some observers wonder whether the UN is too proud or too blind, or simply oblivious when it comes to seeking advice from the locals it went in to protect.

Even Canada, while supporting the UN’s military effort since Aideed “is obstructing relief supplies,” believes that national reconciliation should be a main focus, says external affairs spokesperson Rodney Moore.

He says Canada continues to urge the UN to move quickly on national reconciliation, bringing together women’s groups, clan elders and other non-warlord groups.

“One of the areas where the UN operation went wrong is the tendency to deal with the ‘superpowers’ of Somalia while ignoring groups like women’s collectives,” says World Visions’ Philip Maher, who has just returned from Somalia.

“Part of the problem is misunderstanding,” Maher says. “The UN hasn’t done a great job of telling Somalis what they are doing.”

Many point to the peaceful north, where the as yet internationally unrecognized Somaliland offers a successful model, combining women’s groups and elders to wrest control.

“Does the UN know what it’s doing?”: Now Magazine, July 1993. This incident was the basis of the 2001 film Black Hawk Down. 

More on this story here: Somali Killings Reveal Ugly Side Of Elite Regiment

More investigative journalism here: 

Peaceniks Questioning Air-Raid Strategy In Bosnia

Study Says Jetliner Air Quality Poses Health Risks: CUPE Takes On Airline Industry With Findings Of Survey

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Pax Chaotica: A Re-evaluation of Post-WWII Economic and Political Order

Paper delivered to the School of Politics and Government, Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK, 2000

“The strongest is never strong enough to maintain his mastery at all times unless he transforms his strength into right and obedience into duty…Yielding to force is an act of necessity, not of will; at the very most, it is an act of prudence (Rousseau 1762).” 

By David South

This paper analyses the following proposition: the key post-war institutions were neither an intended, nor an adequate, response to the economic and political challenges of the post-1945 world.

There is ample evidence to show that the plethora of post-war institutions were  intended, and were a deliberate consequence of American policy-makers seeking to control the geo-political fallout of the most catastrophic conflict of human history, World War II.

In many respects institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were a sophisticated and modern approach to a new global order minus the old imperial powers. They were an act of significant imagination and inspiration drawn from a long tradition in asserting the rule of law over the rule of anarchy; the rights of the weak over the tyranny of the strong.

However, these institutions have repeatedly failed to meet the economic and political challenges of the past 55 years. The commitment of the United States to these bodies tailed off after World War II, and America displayed a lack of will to mature them beyond a dependence on American initiative and action.

There is substantial evidence to support the argument that the hegemony of Pax Americana over the last half century undermined the evolution of these institutions, sustaining a chaotic world order that has not delivered prolonged peace or prosperity for a large number of the world’s citizens and that these institutions were ill prepared to confront the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s.

This paper will explore the inadequacies of the global institutions to meet two key aspirations of the post-war world: conflict resolution and avoidance and economic prosperity based on free markets and democratic regimes.

I will argue that, while this period avoided a major conflagration on the scale of the world wars, it was not a period of peace. Regional conflicts, costly both in terms of human life and of finance, plagued every one of the years since World War II. This has been called a period of Pax Americana (Knutsen 1999). I will argue that, rather than a period of global harmony and prosperity anchored by the American hegemon, it has been a period of Pax Chaotica, a “macabre dance of death in which the rulers of the superpowers mobilize their own populations to support harsh and brutal measures directed against victims within what they take to be their respective domains, where they are ‘protecting their legitimate interests,’” as Noam Chomsky describes it (Chomsky 1995: 207). Pax Chaotica is a period in which there is an illusion of stability offered by a hegemon, but in which the hegemon’s military, economic and moral superiority is unable to secure actual peace and prosperity in the world. The hegemon is out of balance, its military and economic superiority in predominance, while its moral superiority and credibility wanes and withers on the vine.

I will analyse how adequate the global institutions were in the context of the concept of hegemony — in particular the hegemony of the United States, which has not relinquished this hegemony to the global institutions it initially set up. I will conclude that the 1990s has been a period of half measures, incremental attempts at bolstering the concept of international security by the community of nations, but that those attempts, as in the case of the Gulf War or in Kosovo, have been still under the direction of the United States.

Making up a master plan: The deliberate development of the institutions

The post-war master plan was comprehensive, and included the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), the International Monetary Fund, the International Trade Organisation (superseded by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as the instrument of freer trade) and the United Nations. A clutch of security organisations was also established after the war, including NATO. As Knutsen aptly puts it:

WITH MEMORIES OF THE INTERWAR RECESSION AND THE NEW DEAL FRESHLY IN MIND, ALREADY, IN THE FIRST YEARS OF THE WAR THEY BEGAN TO DESIGN STABILISING POSTWAR INSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND TRADE — THE IBRD, THE IMF AND THE ITO. … THEY SOUGHT TO SET UP THE MOST IMPORTANT POSTWAR INSTITUTIONS BEFORE THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE WERE EVEN RAISED. THEY RUSHED THE CONFERENCES ON THE UN, IBRD, IMF AND ITO INTO SESSION BEFORE GERMANY AND JAPAN SURRENDERED. (KNUTSEN 1999: 203)

The founding of the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, later the World Bank) marked a turning point in world history. The United States had been attempting to exert greater control on the global order since the first 14 proposals of President Woodrow Wilson during World War I. As European powers declined at the beginning of the 20thcentury, liberal American policymakers saw an opportunity for the US to assert its hegemony over the world and re-write the rules of economic engagement along American lines. The two world wars only made the US wealthier and wealthier: in World War I, by providing armaments to both sides of the conflict; in World War II by joining with Canada as the armament and resource engine for the allied war effort.

In many ways, the new institutions represented a forward-thinking and idealistic policy compared to a global order marked by imperial rivalries. It captured contemporary ideas on economic theory, projected a universalist Lockean ideal that all men from all nations are equal, and it was injected with the idealism and energy of the world’s largest democracy and the strongest market economy.

Franklin Roosevelt, like Woodrow Wilson, saw America’s engagement in the world  war as a struggle to contain European-style militarism, imperialism and exclusive trade blocs. America’s aim, in both wars, was to preserve the conditions for liberal world order — for a democratic system of politics and an economic system based on free-market principles. Wilson and Roosevelt both sought to liberalize world trade. And they both sought to use America’s leading position in world politics to bring other countries into line with America’s policy. (Knutsen 1999: 193)

These institutions ensured that the US had an influence on every facet of world affairs post World War II. It could merge its political and economic goals and ensure it had a stake in the recovery from the war. This played very well when it came to shoring up domestic support in the United States.

Under a World Bank controlled by Americans, development assistance could be focused precisely where America’s core corporations saw the greatest opportunity. And so long as the recipients of America’s foreign aid used it to buy American exports core corporations could venture into global trade confident of receptive markets. Through such means, the playing field of global commerce was sufficiently tipped in America’s direction so that by the mid-1950s even the National Association of Manufacturers could be persuaded to support tariff reduction. (Reich 1992: 64)

The institutions were philosophically strong, too. Learning from Machiavelli that human relations can be cynical, ruthless and riddled with power agendas, the United Nations offered a peaceful forum to resolve these disputes and a theoretically far more transparent alternative than what had come before. As Weber emphasised, modern states helped to promote capitalist development. With that in mind, the Bretton Woods institutions laid the groundwork for a global financial structure pegged to the US dollar and promoting an American view of free markets.

Hegemony theory and Pax Americana

I argue that these global institutions have shown themselves to be hampered and inadequate when faced with serious political and economic challenges. The root cause is a weakness that is most often cited as their strength: the United States.

Hegemonic stability has been characterised by the emergence of successive dominant liberal powers (Gilpin 1987: 66). What Strange calls “structural power” is essential to the establishment of hegemony over world affairs, since it “confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises (Strange 1998: 25).”

The post-World War II global institutions are an excellent example of the intersection of politics and economy; institutions like the United Nations seek to wield influence in both the political sphere and the economic, most particularly through the Bretton Woods institutions. Hegemonic world order exists, Knutsen suggests, “when the major members of an international system agree on a code of norms, rules and laws which helps govern the behaviour of all. This agreement reflects the rhetorical skills of a particular great power (Knutsen 1999: 49).” This is what happened towards the end of World War II, as the United States wrote the new world order according to its own rules.

As further evidence of US supremacy, the new global rules were constructed so as to force America’s superpower rivals, the USSR and China, to join “its” institutions, not the other way around (though Taiwan stood in for the People’s Republic in the United Nations, against the protests of the USSR, until 1971).

The US became the hegemon because the Soviet Union had very little to offer, either in terms of economic assistance or of political freedoms.

Historians now understand that potential clients encouraged the United States to become a hegemon at the end of World War II: the term “empire by invitation” has come to characterize what happened. The Soviet bid for postwar influence lacked any comparable legitimacy, and so quickly came up against a condition that creates major difficulties for hegemons, which is lack of consent. (Gaddis 1992: 177)

Do as I say, not as I do: The rise and fall of the hegemon’s moral advantage

A large part of the credibility of the US hegemony was bolstered by its moral advantage vis-à-vis other nations. A heady cocktail of democratic freedoms, economic success and military might led many other nations to believe the US and its institutions had got it right where others had failed.

As Strange notes: “President Truman had followed up in his augural address to the Congress with the firm promise of American help to peoples seeking freedom and a better material life. Moral authority based on faith in American intentions powerfully reinforced its other sources of structural power (Strange 1994: 32).”

Supporters of US hegemony, like John G. Ruggie, believe the hegemon must be liberal-minded. Otherwise:

IF THE OTHER STATES BEGIN TO REGARD THE ACTIONS OF THE HEGEMON AS SELF-SERVING AND CONTRARY TO THEIR OWN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS, THE HEGEMONIC SYSTEM WILL BE GREATLY WEAKENED. IT WILL ALSO DETERIORATE IF THE CITIZENRY OF THE HEGEMONIC POWER BELIEVES THAT OTHER STATES ARE CHEATING, OR IF THE COSTS OF LEADERSHIP BEGIN TO EXCEED THE PERCEIVED BENEFITS. (GILPIN 1987: 73)

The US steadily weakened its credibility and moral advantage in both the areas of conflict resolution and avoidance, and in promoting economic prosperity.

Conflict resolution and avoidance

The US was seen as willing to distort global institutions to fight its ideological — and real — battles with the Soviet Union, and its proxies around the world. The US’s credibility as a promoter of peace and security was severely hampered by the Korean War, the Vietnam War and a dubious record of support for undemocratic regimes and guerrilla movements. These conflicts were intended to “contain” the Soviet Union and the spread of communism and to support regimes that were friendly to free markets. This was played out in a cynical cat-and-mouse game with the Soviet Union, where both sides avoided direct confrontation with each other and used third countries to wage their ideological battles.

Gaddis takes an overly generous view of the Cold War high-wire act, but it is worth being reminded:

BUT THE 1950S AND 1960S DID SEE A REMARKABLE SEQUENCE OF POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS CONFRONTATIONS — DIENBIENPHU, 1954; QUEMOY-MATSA, 1955; HUNGARY-SUEZ, 1956; LEBANON, 1958; BERLIN, 1958-59; THE U2 INCIDENT, 1960; CUBA, 1961; BERLIN, 1961; LAOS, 1961-62; THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962 — EVERYONE OF WHICH WAS RESOLVED WITHOUT MAJOR MILITARY INVOLVEMENT BY EITHER SUPERPOWER. THE SAME COULD NOT BE SAID OF KOREA IN 1950, OR OF VIETNAM AND AFGHANISTAN LATER ON. (GADDIS 1992: 33)

Other than actually being drawn in as a combatant, as in the case of the Korean War, the UN became more of a sideline observer and critic than a robust resolver of conflicts. The UN was critically flawed from the beginning and abrogated its commitment to collective security. It also proved ineffective when confronted with crisis. As Strange points out, one of the biggest weaknesses in the founding of the UN was the Charter. In Article 2, Paragraph 7, all matters of domestic consideration were the business of a state, and in Article 51 states were allowed to form alliances for individual or collective self-defence, “thus reopening the door to a security structure based on alliances and counter-alliance rather than on collective responsibilities for the maintenance of peace between states (Strange 1994: 52).”

The UN was also hampered from developing a collective security maturity by the Security Council. The five permanent members used the veto to control resolutions, with the USSR and the US the most prolific abusers. The US had a total of 69 vetoes from 1945 to 1994; the USSR had 116.

The fall of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s marked the beginning of a new period of instability in large parts of the world. The spotlight is once again on the UN to become an arbiter of conflict; once again it is most active when it is pushed by the United States to act when the US feels there is an interest to be served. This has been the case in the major UN missions in the 1990s, from the Gulf War (oil reserves), to the former Yugoslavia (European security). The UN proved to be ineffective where there was no naked US interest putting pressure on the organisation to act, as in the case of Rwanda. Strange remarks that this has had a demoralising effect on those who seek a security structure upholding international law and the universal rights of man.

The fear that either the world organization would merely be the tool of one or other great power (as indeed it was the tool of the United States in the early 1950s) or that it would be ineffectual — as both the League and the UN have proved to be in the face of grave threats to international peace and order — have been enough to kill any realistic hopes of managing a transition from the present security structure to a multilateral or confederal one. (Strange 1994:52)

Economic prosperity

The second half of the 20th century has been hailed as a period of unprecedented global prosperity. Global gross national product rose from US $300 billion to US $2 trillion from 1945 to 1970 (Reich 1992: 64), though much of this was concentrated in a handful of countries. The major challenge of the 20th century has been the task of spreading prosperity around the world; to more evenly distribute the gains than can be reaped from advances in science and technology. The collapse of the colonial powers left large numbers of underdeveloped nations grappling with independence.

With the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangements in the early 1970s, and the emergence of deregulation in financial flows in the world, the US abrogated much of its responsibility for micro-managing global development. The market was now to do all the work, and being the modern age, rapid capital flows were to make the market work efficiently.

Like the experience with conflict resolution and avoidance, the economic project has been mixed. A dependence on the market has not avoided a dependence on the economic fortunes of the global hegemon. As the US ship rises and sinks, so does the rest of the world. The Global economic system, Panic notes:

WAS RUN BY THE DOMINANT ECONOMIC POWER AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE UNITED STATES. IN THAT SENSE, ITS FORTUNES, LIKE THOSE OF THE CLASSICAL GOLD STANDARD, WERE DIRECTLY LINKED TO THOSE OF THE RELATIVE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND POLICIES OF THE COUNTRY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LARGEST SHARE OF WORLD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, TRADE, AND FINANCE AT THE TIME — PRECISELY THE OUTCOME THAT THOSE ATTENDING THE BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE HAD BEEN ANXIOUS TO AVOID. (PANIC 1995: 46)

By 1994, total world exports were more than 14 times greater than in 1950; output was five times greater than in 1950 (Dicken 1999: 24). But the economic achievements ring hollow if the well-being of the whole planet is taken into consideration. By 1995, 60 percent of the manufacturing in the world occurred in three countries — the United States, Japan and Germany (UNIDO 1996). While manufacturing in developing countries had quadrupled to 20 percent of global output, it was concentrated in a few developing countries with strong ties to the US.

There is a direct connection between US interests and who does well economically. Western Europe was reconstructed rapidly with US money, and Germany became an industrial powerhouse again. The defeated Japan was restored as Asia’s wealthiest nation with American investment and advice. In 1945, 71 percent of world manufacturing was concentrated in four countries. Developed countries were host to 2/3 of foreign direct investment (Dicken 1999: 21). Most FDI is now concentrated in industrial, developed countries.

There is a direct link between the failures of the UN and the global economy. The weakness of the international security arrangements also have an impact on economies. Vast sums of money are re-directed towards weapons purchases and away from human needs. For many smaller economies, this is a punishing drain on national resources and the funds are often borrowed from elsewhere. As Chomsky noted in the 1980s, “The fact is that both of the superpowers — and many lesser powers as well — are ruining their economies and threatening world peace, indeed human survival, by a mindless commitment to military production for themselves and for export (Chomsky 1995: 209).”

There are concrete examples of developing countries that have achieved significant development gains, reaping the gains of peace and freer world trade. A group of 18 developing countries enjoyed growth rates in the 1990s of over five percent (DFID 2000: 66). This is attributed to more open trade policies compared to other developing countries (though many other countries have been equally open to trade, like Mongolia, but have not reaped the same benefits). China has enjoyed unprecedented growth, but it also has increasing rates of unemployment and violent unrest in its western regions. Sub-Saharan Africa’s 600 million population generates exports no greater than Malaysia’s 20 million (DFID 2000: 67).

In regard to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the majority of its 140 members are developing countries. Not a perfect organisation, its agenda is dominated by a few wealthy nations, but the alternative of a world of bilateral trade deals hangs as a spectre if it fails. As the DFID report, Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for the Poor, points out:

DESPITE PROGRESS OVER THE LAST 50 YEARS, DEVELOPED COUNTRIES MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AGAINST THE EXPORTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES…TOTAL DEVELOPING COUNTRY GAINS FROM A 50 PER CENT CUT IN TARIFFS, BY BOTH DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, WOULD BE IN THE ORDER OF $150 BILLION — AROUND THREE TIMES AID FLOWS. (DFID 2000: 69)

Conclusion

The postwar world order and the use of global institutions to build it, was a deliberate policy of the United States. It, however, proved only a half measure and the over-dependence on the United States ensured that these institutions were hampered when confronted with economic and political crises. As I have argued, a state of Pax Chaotica was the result.

For Pax Chaotica to end, there needs to be a renewed effort by the United States to shore up global institutions and to develop a concrete plan to ensure that the global institutions become the global hegemon in every sense of the word. There have been incremental moves in this direction, including attempts to pay dues owed by the US to the UN.

There needs to be a complete shift from the realist American interests of Pax Chaotica to the interests of the community of nations. In fact, there is an opportunity for a convergence of core American values — respect for individual liberty, freedom of expression, democracy — with the goals of the global institutions.

As for international institutions, they must show themselves to not only be just, but also to be seen to be just. Institutions can no longer work in the shadows as they have in the past. Well-educated, wealthy protesters in Western countries will no doubt continue to demand transparency.

In The Interests Of The Exploited?: The Role Of Development Pressure Groups In The UK

A Steppe Back?: Economic Liberalisation And Poverty Reduction In Mongolia

The Sweet Smell Of Failure: The World Bank And The Persistence Of Poverty

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Peaceniks Questioning Air-Raid Strategy In Bosnia

Muslims say peaceful alternatives will aid cleansing

By David South

Now Magazine (Toronto, Canada), May 13-19, 1993

While Bosnian Muslims continue to demand either airstrikes against the Serbians or weapons to defend themselves, there is little consensus among Canadian peace groups and political parties that these measures are the key to a long-lasting peace.

The differences are as graphic as those between Washington and Ottawa. While president Bill Clinton is asking European nations to support air strikes, prime minister Brian Mulroney has publicly opposed such bombing raids as an answer to the brutal ethnic cleansing of Muslims being carried out by the Serbs.

“We are still developing our position in terms of support for military intervention,” says Roxanne Dube, assistant to Liberal foreign policy critic Lloyd Axworthy.

Dube says, “We need something more comprehensive than just airstrikes, which alone could jeopardize our troops.”

NDP foreign affairs critic Svend Robinson is more willing to consider military action under UN auspices. But first he wants “a vice-like embargo on Serbia and the establishment of safe havens and humanitarian corridors.

“If the slaughter continues, I personally would not exclude the posibility of further military action,” he says.

“The response of the United Nations, and NATO in particular, has been appallingly inadequate. It has allowed the Bosnian Serbs to consolidate their territorial position. And their latest sabotage of the Vance/Owen proposal has left the international community with no alternative but to isolate Serbia.

“The Bosnian Serbs are just continuing their widespread rape of Muslim women, ethnic cleansing, torture – the world has got to say, stop.”

Among peace groups there is a feeling that military intervention is not a longterm solution.

“We don’t have a position,” says Tamara Storic of Greenpeace Canada, a response echoed by the Toronto Disarmament Network. “We’re in much the same situation as the UN. Nobody knows what to do.”

No position

The Canadian Peace Alliance’s Gideon Forman understands the frustration that fuels calls for bombing, but doesn’t believe it is a longterm solution.

“Those who say go in there and bomb are not all crazy,” he says. “They hear about ethnic cleansing, they hear about rape camps – and they see bombing as a way to stop that. But our position is that a little more restraint has to be shown.”

He advocates a combination of sanctions and diplomacy for a longterm peaceful solution.

Maggie Helwig of ACT for Disarmament says she has little to offer in the short term, pointing out, “Maybe at this point there is little anyone can do.” She is also sympathetic to those who want to arm Bosnian Muslims, but feels it wouldn’t help the situation.

She says, “I believe they are the legitimate government. But providing weapons is not going to contribute to a lasting peace.”

Helwig favours targeted sanctions that would allow opposition organizations in Serbia to receive supplies while the government wouldn’t, combined with international support for peace and opposition groups.

“The only way we can end the Serbian aggression to to support the opposition in Serbia, the peace movement and the women’s movement. The reason they aren’t having much influence is that they aren’t getting any international support.”

Fatima Basic, spokesperson for the Canadian Bosnian refugee groups, says that while she supports Helwig’s plans for helping opposition and women’s groups, she is angry that it is being put out as an alternative to military intervention and air strikes. She says the West “should have done something before we lost half a million people.”

Imam Tajib Pasanbegovic, religious leader of Canadian Bosnian Muslims, says of Helwig’s thoughts, “It’s a ridiculous idea by itself. It will take several years, and by then there will be no Bosnian Muslims left. There is not time. Imagine if we gave this chance to Hitler in the second world war – another 5 million Jews would have disappeared.”

Both he and Basic are bitter that while Clinton seeks European support for bombing, “Prime minister Brian Mulroney is going behind his back telling the world not to interfere.”

Life embargo

Pasanbegovic says if the West will not intervene with at least half the bombing if did in the Gulf War, “They should life the arms embargo and return things to a starting point. If the West is not going to defend us, at least let us defend ourselves.”

However, Carolyn Langdon of Voice of Women, a peace group working with peace and women’s organizations in the former Yugoslav republics, says, “Our position is against intervention, including limited military strikes. We are supporting the civil society groups, the opposition against the nationalism and war policies of their governments.”

Her group sets up rape crisis centres and sponsors women to come to Canada to raise awareness.

David Isenverg, a senior research analyst at the left-leaning Washington-based Center for Defense Information, says sources tell him that the Clinton administration believes air strikes are only a means of levelling the playing field for the Muslims.

He says a Pentagon report released this Wednesday will discredit the claims of air strikes’ accuracy, citing failures during the Gulf War. Clinton will decide on air strikes after Saturday’s referendum in Bosnia, when Serbs will vote on whether to accept a Western peace plan.

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